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Objective To empirically describe the integration of pediatric disaster services into regional systems of care after
the April 27, 2011, tornado in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, a community with no pediatric emergency department or
pediatric intensive care unit and few pediatric subspecialists.
Study design Data were obtained in interviews with key informants including professional staff and managers
from public health and emergency management agencies, prehospital emergency medical services, fire depart-
ments, hospital nurses, physicians, and the trauma program coordinator.
Results A single hospital in Tuscaloosa served 800 patients on the night of the tornado. More than 100 of these
patients were children, including more than 20 with critical injuries. Many children were unaccompanied and
unidentified on arrival. Resuscitation and stabilization were performed by nonpediatric prehospital and emergency
department staff. More than 20 children were secondarily transported to the nearest children’s hospital an hour’s
drive away under the care of nonpediatric local emergency medical services providers. No preventable adverse
events were identified in the resuscitation and secondary transport phases of care. Stockpiled supplies and equip-
ment were adequate to serve the needs of the disaster victims, including the children.
Conclusion Essential aspects of preparation include pediatric-specific clinical skills, supplies and equipment,
operational disaster plans, and interagency practice embedded in everyday work. Opportunities for improvement
identified include more timely response to warnings, improved practices for identifying unaccompanied children,
and enhanced child safety in shelters. Successful responses depended on integration of pediatric services into
regional systems of care. (J Pediatr 2012;-:---).
D
isasters may injure children far from a pediatric hospital, and disaster surges of children can overwhelm pediatric
facilities. Thus, the need to integrate pediatric disaster services into regional systems of care has been recognized.1-3
Little experience with pediatric care in major disasters has been reported, and commentators have called for better em-
pirical data to guide preparedness.4,5
The severe tornado occurring in Tuscaloosa, Alabama on April 27, 2011, provides a case study to empirically examine
pediatric-specific services and their integration into regional systems of care after a recent major disaster. In a community
with no pediatric emergency department (ED) or pediatric intensive care unit (ICU) facing one of the largest ED disaster surges
at a single hospital in US history, the successes provide a model for other regions, and the lessons learned suggest improvement
opportunities for all.ED Emergency department
EMS Emergency medical services
ICU Intensive care unitMethodsTuscaloosa is a city of 90 468 people in which pediatricians, general practitioners, and a limited number of pediatric subspe-
cialists provide ambulatory care for children.6 Pediatric acute care subspecialists in the community are limited to neonatolo-
gists. Tuscaloosa is served by skilled and experienced prehospital providers, a general ED, and an adult ICU at a single hospital.
Prehospital care is usually provided according to statewide emergency medical services (EMS) protocols, with some, but not all,
advanced life support interventions requiring medical control phone or radio authorization. The hospital is the 538-bed DCH
Regional Medical Center, whose services include the regional trauma center and an ED serving an average of 185 patients per
day. A 20-bed pediatric inpatient area with an average census of 8 serves common low-risk medical, traumatic, and surgical
conditions. Because the regional medical center lacks a pediatric ED or ICU, critically ill or injured children are usually trans-
ferred from Tuscaloosa to the nearest children’s hospital in Birmingham, an hour’s drive away, under the medical control ofFrom the 1Division of Pediatric Critical Care Medicine,pediatric transport coordinators at the children’s hospital.
Pediatric disaster services and regional systems of care after the April 27, 2011,
tornado were explored in key informant interviews, conducted between June and
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managers from state and local public health and emergency
management agencies, prehospital EMS, fire departments,
hospital nursing and physician staff, and the regional trauma
program coordinator. A total of 19 interviews were conduct-
ed, 14 individually and 5 in groups, involving a total of 50 in-
formants. All interviews were conducted face to face except
for one phone interview.
The semistructured interviews began with open-ended
questions regarding local disaster mitigation, preparation,
and responses to the April 27 tornado (Appendix; available
at www.jpeds.com). Clarifying details and examples were
sought in the interviews, as well as from other cited publicly
available sources. Notes were taken during all interviews.
Interviews were recorded with the consent of the
informants. Notes and recordings were analyzed to identify
themes pertaining to integration of pediatric services into
regional systems. This study of professionals’ roles and
observations was considered exempt from review by the
Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human
Subjects at SUNY Upstate Medical University.
Results
An F4 tornado passed across Tuscaloosa at 5 PM onWednes-
day April 27, 2011. The path of severe damage across residen-
tial and commercial neighborhoods ranged from 0.5 to 1mile
wide and was more than 5 miles long, damaging or destroy-
ing more than 5700 structures in an area directly affecting
13 700 people.7 Forty-six deaths occurred, with a mortality
rate of 3.4 deaths per 1000 population in the directly affected
area.8,9 As reflected by fatal injuries, children were involved in
proportion to their numbers in the population. Eight deaths
occurred in children aged <18 years (17% of all deaths),9 and
children aged 0-17 years account for 17.4% of Tuscaloosa’s
population.6
Response, First Hour
The entire severe damage zone was initially impassable to ve-
hicles. Several severely injured children were among the first
victims found, including some who had been playing in
a playground when the storm hit. In the rubble of destroyed
homes, some fatally injured adults were found lying over
children in successful efforts to protect them.
During the first hour after the storm, fire departments set
up command posts and EMS staffed triage and treatment
centers at the edge of the severe damage zone. Although
the damaged area remained inaccessible to vehicles, victims
were carried by hand, pulled on mattresses, or rolled on
wheelbarrows to the triage and treatment areas. Care in
the field was limited to first aid and immediate life-saving
interventions. Occasionally paramedics considered ad-
vanced life support treatment, such as needle decompres-
sion of a suspected tension pneumothorax in a child,
balancing the urgency of field interventions against the short
ride to the hospital in a setting of overwhelming needs.
Private vehicles transported some injured patients to the2
hospital before an adequate number of ambulances were
available.
Later during the first hour, the Tuscaloosa Department of
Transportation began clearing main roads into the severe
damage zone. As a result, all-terrain vehicles, small pickup
trucks, and later fire trucks and ambulances could carry res-
cue and medical equipment into and transport patients out
of the heavily damaged area.
The tornado passed within 2 city blocks of DCH Regional
Medical Center. Inpatients and staff had been moved to in-
ternal locations away from windows just before the storm
hit. A few windows were blown out, power was lost and
then immediately restored by generators, but the hospital
sustained no other direct damage. The hospital initiated
emergency incident command procedures. Clinical staff
were assigned to their usual work locations or alternate areas
where they had previously received cross-training. Emer-
gency physicians, anesthesiologists, and general and orthope-
dic surgeons were assigned to care for critically injured
persons. Neonatologists assisted with advanced life support
of infants. Primary care pediatricians were assigned to care
for children after initial resuscitation and for those less se-
verely injured. Family medicine and internal medicine prac-
titioners cared for adults with moderate and milder injuries.
Radiologists interpreted images immediately.
Response, First Night
All patients from Tuscaloosa needing ED care were trans-
ported to DCH Regional Medical Center because of the lon-
ger distance to other facilities, and because a continuing
tornado threat in the region interfered with primary trans-
port elsewhere. Given the overwhelming workload in the field
and at the hospital, hospital clinical leaders instructed EMS
staff to provide all necessary prehospital emergency care ac-
cording to statewide EMS protocols, without phone or radio
medical control. At the hospital, premade hospital adminis-
trative packages to identify and register 450 patients were
used up in less than 4 hours. Subsequently, the ED used
EMS disaster patient identification tags. With so many
patients moving through the ED, it became difficult to track
patients andmatch reports of critical diagnostic tests with the
location of patients requiring immediate interventions.
Dozens of unaccompanied children arrived at the ED,
identifiable only by the location from which they were trans-
ported. Some were too young or severely injured to provide
information. Others, because of fear and stress, simply re-
fused to speak.
Along with a large number of adults, more than 20 chil-
dren with critical traumatic brain, chest, or abdominal in-
juries required endotracheal intubation in the ED.
Intubation, chest tube placement, and vascular access, in-
cluding central venous catheter insertion, in children were
performed by emergency physicians, anesthesiologists, and
surgeons, and some infants were intubated by neonatologists.
Two children required immediate craniotomy, and other
pediatric surgical interventions were delayed. Critically
injured children were kept in the ED, receiving 1:1 nursingKanter
- 2012 ORIGINAL ARTICLESor physician care for the first several hours, including airway
maintenance, ventilation, and fluid and analgesic manage-
ment, until secondary transport could be arranged. Children
with less severe injuries were admitted to the pediatric floor
at DCH or discharged. Of the approximately 800 patients
receiving care in the ED during the night of the storm,
more than 100 were children.
Phone discussions occurred in the first hours between phy-
sicians in Tuscaloosa and Children’s Hospital of Alabama in
Birmingham regarding the care of critically injured children
and plans for transfer. The idea of sending pediatric staff
from Birmingham to provide care at Tuscaloosa was rejected,
because this would have depleted the staff needed to serve
statewide pediatric referrals at Children’s Hospital. Instead,
Children’s Hospital instructed DCH to secondarily transport
critically injured children after stabilization, under the care of
local Tuscaloosa staff. No further attempt was made to use
pediatric critical care transport teams, because insufficient
staff and vehicles at Children’s Hospital would impose long
delays on the mass evacuation. More than 20 critically in-
jured children were transferred later that night from DCH
in Tuscaloosa to Children’s Hospital of Alabama in Birming-
ham. Secondary transport care was provided by nonpediatric
EMS staff from the Tuscaloosa area, using statewide EMS ad-
vanced life support protocols without real-time radio medi-
cal control because of the overwhelming workload of hospital
staff. Most interhospital transports were performed by
ground ambulance, because weather conditions limited heli-
copter flights. Subsequent reviews conducted at Tuscaloosa
and Birmingham concluded that pediatric resuscitations
and interhospital transports were accomplished without
a single clinically significant preventable adverse event (death
or major physiological deterioration).
In addition to transfers from DCH in Tuscaloosa, Chil-
dren’s Hospital of Alabama in Birmingham evaluated a total
of 60 pediatric trauma victims injured by multiple tornadoes
across 13 counties, 39 of whom required admission.10 A rel-
atively low patient census at the time of the disaster allowed
this large number of admissions. Contingency plans were
considered to request National Guard assistance in trans-
porting children exceeding the surge capacity of Children’s
Hospital to pediatric hospitals in adjacent regions. Transport
outside the region was not necessary, however.
Attempts to identify unaccompanied children continued
at Children’s Hospital. In some cases, digital photos were
sent electronically for viewing and identification by family
members at remote locations over the next several days.
Although the tornado resulted in historically large pediat-
ric and adult ED surges, statewide stockpiles of equipment
and supplies strategically located near DCH Regional Medi-
cal Center and Children’s Hospital of Alabama were suffi-
cient to provide all life-saving interventions. In Tuscaloosa,
trailers containing stockpiled items arrived at the hospital
within the first four hours after the storm. In particular,
supplies of pediatric endotracheal tubes were sufficient, al-
though occasionally smaller available endotracheal tubes
had to be substituted for unavailable sizes. Disaster stockpilesThe 2011 Tuscaloosa Tornado: Integration of Pediatric Disaster Sof ventilators stored at Children’s Hospital were used to sup-
plement the usual hospital inventory. In addition to life sup-
port equipment, informants emphasized the importance of
adequate supplies of diapers and infant formula for a busy
ED or shelter serving many infants.
On the night of the storm, the Red Cross opened a large
public shelter accommodating 600 individuals in Tuscaloosa.
Buses shuttled large numbers from triage treatment centers
and from the hospital ED to the shelter. Although some
managers anticipated security problems in shelters serving
families with children along with an unscreened adult popu-
lation, informants were not aware of any adverse incidents.
Response, Next Several Days
Although individuals with chronic medical conditions were
encouraged to relocate from homes lacking electrical power,
some families refused. One technology-assisted child was
supported at home with rechargeable batteries, and later
with a donated generator.
Early Mitigation and Preparedness
Successes in emergency responses are best understood in the
context of previous efforts to reduce risk and prepare for
emergencies. Early preparation was informed by the high
frequency of severe weather events in the region. Tuscaloosa
had well-developed plans for tornadoes, as well as for shelter-
ing populations after Gulf Coast evacuations ahead of hurri-
canes. Interagency practice for responses was embedded in
everyday work as a result of frequent severe weather warn-
ings. State funds provided the strategically located equipment
and supply stockpiles that enabled immediate responses to
ED surges on the night of the storm. In addition, federal
EMS for Children grants had been used to purchase
pediatric-specific equipment used in resuscitation of dozens
of critically injured children. Although very few pediatric
acute care subspecialists were available in Tuscaloosa, many
hospital and EMS staff had training in pediatric advanced
life support skills.
Emergency preparedness in Tuscaloosa is also maintained
by practice associated with the periodic doubling of the com-
munity population size on 7 autumn weekends each year
during home football games at the University of Alabama.
In addition to anticipating security and communications is-
sues, EMS must serve dozens of illnesses among spectators.
Communication among emergency managers during the
first night and subsequent days was reliably conducted using
the SouthernLINC cell phone network provided by the power
utility company throughout Alabama. The reliability of these
telephones depends on rapid deployment of mobile equip-
ment to replace damaged towers and a priority system that
connects emergency managers’ calls before those of other
users. In contrast, commercial cell phones serving the public
failed for several days after the storm.
In addition to plans and practice, many informants em-
phasized that successful responses depend on resourceful
leaders and staff adapting to unforeseen circumstances based
on their training and experience. Interagency coordinationervices into Regional Systems of Care 3
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interactions. Many informants also emphasized the impor-
tance of trust and familiarity among leaders based on long-
standing personal relationships, citing membership in the
same churches and other community organizations.
Last Day Mitigation and Preparedness
Based on regional predictions of tornado risk exceeding
95%,11 local preparations on April 27 included maximizing
the number of ambulances in service and reassigning EMS
staff from administrative to clinical duties. A mobile support
and repair vehicle activated earlier in the day was important
for keeping ambulances in service after the storm. Just-in-
time training of EMS staff emphasized attention to basic
tasks.
Many schools and businesses throughout Alabama had
been closed on April 27 in anticipation of severe weather.
Although the Tuscaloosa tornado passed through the com-
munity late in the afternoon hours after schools would
have been dismissed, the early closure of some businesses
might have reduced the amount of rush hour traffic vulner-
able to the storm. Risk reduction also was provided by last-
minute tornado warning sirens and televised warnings of
the approaching tornado.
Discussion
Responses to the Tuscaloosa tornado of April 27, 2011, pro-
vide an example of highly effective services for children in-
tegrated into regional systems of disaster care. Essential
preparation included pediatric-specific clinical skills, pedi-
atric supplies and equipment, general operational disaster
planning that included interagency practice embedded in
everyday work, and experienced resourceful leaders and
staff.
Several pediatric-specific opportunities for improvement
were apparent. First, although warnings of the approaching
tornado were accurate and timely, some in the community
failed to either receive or heed the warnings. Children were
overrepresented among the population outdoors at the
time of the tornado, and they suffered a high rate of fatal in-
juries. Thus, risk communications targeting children warrant
improvement. Second, practices for identifying and tracking
unaccompanied children in disasters could be strengthened.
Third, security procedures for shelters serving children must
account for unscreened adults sharing the same facility.
The value of interagency practice in nondisaster everyday
work has been emphasized recently.12 For example, large
sporting events requiring community-wide coordination
can be an occasion to improve incident command profi-
ciency and interagency collaboration. Although an inventory
of pediatric-specific disaster stockpiles was not available from
key informants in Alabama, detailed recommendations on
supplies and equipment have been published recently.13 In
all regions, strategic locations of stockpiles must be tailored
to local circumstances if the supplies are to be immediately
available. The decision to provide interhospital mass evacua-4
tion without pediatric critical care transport teams was con-
sistent with results of a discrete event simulation.14 In this
case, the advantage of more rapid transport by local nonpedi-
atric EMS teams was not compromised by preventable ad-
verse events. The local direction of disaster responses,
supported by statewide resources, was consistent with the na-
tional framework for disaster operations.15
This study based on key informant interviews reports
quantitative and semiquantitative observations, as well as
qualitative insights provided by expert participants in the
disaster response. The design does not permit a quantitative
analysis of hypotheses. Whether qualitative or quantitative,
lessons learned in a single historical event cannot provide
complete guidance for responses to future emergencies.
Nevertheless, this report adds empirical experience to
a sparse existing database regarding pediatric disaster re-
sponses and may contribute to planning in communities
lacking pediatric acute care subspecialists. Successful re-
sponses to the Tuscaloosa tornado serve as a challenge to
all of us. How many regions could match Alabama’s perfor-
mance? n
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Appendix. Template for Semistructured Interviews
What roles and services did your organization provide for children and for
others?
What was the effect of the disaster on your organization’s ability to function?
Did your responses proceed according to plans?
Interactions among response organizations?
Sources of information and methods of communication during the response?
What went well?
What did not go well?
What improvements and adjustments has your organization already made as
a result of this experience?
Lessons learned for next time? Next community?
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